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since Russia deployed its troops on the Crimea, international lawyers have been
busy analysing the events and possible legal justifications for Russia’s actions.
Insufficient attention, however, has been devoted to the question as to whether
Ukraine (and even NATO) may act in self-defence. Upon closer inspection, the
answer is less clear than it seems at first sight.
Armed attack
The first and central issue in this regard is the actual (or imminent) occurrence of
an armed attack as mentioned in article 51 UN Charter. As the ICJ noted in the
good old Nicaragua case, only “most grave forms of the use of force” constitute
an armed attack and thus rank somewhat above violations of the prohibition on
the use of force. In trying to define “armed attacks”, the court then – although the
resolution was never intended to define the notion of “armed attack”– relied on the
famous resolution on the definition of Aggression, which is also interesting for us
in the present case: Firstly, its article 3(a) mentions “[t]he invasion or attack by the
armed forces of a State of the territory of another State, or any military occupation,
however temporary, resulting from such invasion or attack, or any annexation by
the use of force of the territory of another State or part thereof.” Equally important,
its article 3(e) refers to “[t]he use of armed forces of one State which are within the
territory of another State with the agreement of the receiving State, in contravention
of the conditions provided for in the agreement or any extension of their presence
in such territory beyond the termination of the agreement” – thus, while Russia has
leased the Sebastopol fleet base until 2042, its recent actions clearly go beyond this
agreement.
At the outset, even although the situation has remained comparatively calm, the
issue of whether there has been an armed attack by Russia does not seem to
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pose any problems per se. Oddly enough, an armed attack in the legal sense does
not necessarily require the actual occurrence of an armed attack as commonly
understood by the interested layman.
Immediacy
The fact that the initial attack is concluded and Ukraine has ordered its troops to
withdraw from the Crimea requires a few words on immediacy. Most significantly,
immediacy does not limit a state to act in self-defence only as long as the armed
attack is still in progress. Such a restrictive application of this requirement would
neglect that military preparations may take some time. It rather requires a certain
temporal proximity between the initial attack and the response to it. As Yoram
Dinstein has noted in the latest edition of his classic “War, Aggression, and Self
Defence”, “the longer the period between the armed attack and the response, the
more pressure there will be on the State concerned to resolve the matter by peaceful
means.” In other words, this requirement basically adds substance to the obligation
to resort to peaceful means of settling the dispute over the Crimea before acting by
using force.
Necessity
In addition, Ukraine may be barred from using force because of the necessity
principle. This requirement is usually applied as a preliminary question when
determining the legality of a specific measure taken as a response to an armed
attack. It asks whether action taken in self-defence was necessary “to achieve a
legitimate purpose of self-defence” (Randelzhofer/Nolte in the Charter Commentary
by Simma et al), which, in our case, would be the expulsion of Russian troops
from Ukrainian soil. Still, the fact that the initial attack has been concluded is
also significant here. To quote Dinstein again, the decisive question is whether
“an interval of time” between force and counter-force is “realistically available”. If
answered in the affirmative, using counter-force instead of seeking a non-violent
solution would thus not be justified. At least as long as there is reason to believe
that talks, conferences, mediation, and whatever diplomats have up their sleeves,
or even sanctions can be expected to be successful, Ukraine would be barred from
using force in self-defence.
It all depends on Russia’s readiness to engage in peaceful means
of settling the dispute
Obviously, this combined effect of the immediacy and the necessity criteria is
somewhat unsatisfactory. As Oscar Schachter has argued in his article “The Right
of States to Use Armed Force” from 1984, “[h]istory and common sense tell us
that an aggressor, having seized the territory of people, might enjoy the fruits
of his aggression while forestalling peaceful solutions through dilatory tactics or
unreasonable conditions.” Of particular interest are Schachter’s subsequent words
on the role of the Security Council in situations of this kind: “It is true that, under
article 39 conditions, the Security Council may seek to bring about compliance
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by requiring the aggressor to yield up the fruits of his aggression and to provide
reparations for his wrong, but the prevailing political differences and the requirement
of unanimity of the permanent members of the Council render such enforcement
measures unlikely.” Hence, even if the prospects for cooperation in the Security
Council are much better nowadays, matters have remained unchanged when the
vital interests of one of the five permanent member states (P-5) are affected, making
these 30 year old findings eerily relevant. It would be absurd to require Ukraine to
abstain from using force because of the prospect of a peaceful solution only to watch
Russia block any Security Council resolution or participate in talks to delay time and
ultimately rule out forceful action because the initial attack has been over for too
long. In other words: The more obvious the lack of willingness of Russia to find a
diplomatic way out of the current crisis, the stronger the claim to act in self-defence.
The recent decision to carry out a referendum and the subsequent incorporation
of the Crimea into the Russian Federation even implies that Ukraine – as long as
the prospects for success remain as dim as they are at the moment – could lawfully
restore the status quo ante bellum by force long after the initial attack has been
completed.
Collective Self-Defence
Nevertheless, we must not forget that Ukraine’s military capabilities are clearly
inferior to those of Russia, rendering any determination regarding the lawfulness to
act in self-defence utterly irrelevant. Successful unilateral action by Ukraine therefore
seems highly unlikely for the foreseeable future. Ukraine would have to rely on
outside help, i.e. collective self-defence, and issue an explicit request to provide
individual states or even NATO with a legal basis to get involved.
Law vs. Realpolitik
From a political standpoint, however, such a drastic step would be a disaster. All of
a sudden, an asymmetric and thereby somewhat predictable conflict between two
states could be transformed into a full-fledged military confrontation between various
states with nuclear capabilities and additionally risk unforeseeable reactions by
other influential actors. In this sense, one cannot help but agree (albeit for different
reasons) with Eric Posner’s conclusion that the US and its allies should refrain from
taking action. International lawyers need to cope with the fact that the law falls silent
in matters of tremendous geostrategic importance.
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